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Liability for Misrepresentation – European Lessons on
Causation from the Netherlands
by
Bas J. de Jong1
Listed companies may be liable to investors for misrepresentation. A causal connection be-
tween the investor’s alleged harm and the misstatement or omission will need to be estab-
lished for a successful damage claim. This article addresses causation, specifically the causal
connection between the misstatement (or omission) and the investment decision. Proving this
causal connection is often problematic, which raises the question how investors can be effec-
tively protected without inviting excessive litigation. Recently, the Dutch Supreme Court has
accepted an indirect causal connection as sufficient and has adopted a presumption on behalf
of investors on favorable terms in a prospectus liability case. A showing of amaterial misstate-
ment by investors activates the presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court justifies this by
reference to the Prospectus Directive, which it interprets as requiring an effective protection
of (potential) investors. The influence of the Prospectus Directive on the law of causation can
be relevant for other European jurisdictions as well. The approach to adopt a presumption
based on European disclosure directives could extend beyond prospectus liability cases to all
lawsuits alleging misrepresentation on the secondary market. These developments are dis-
cussed and a comparison is made between the law of the Netherlands, the US and Germany.
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1 Introduction
Listed companies may be liable to investors for misrepresentation. Lawsuits
alleging misrepresentation are common in both Europe and the United States.
In European jurisdictions, misrepresentation may be the result of the publi-
cation of a misleading prospectus, misleading (annual, half-yearly or quar-
terly) financial reports, misleading interim management statements and other
ad hoc statements, or a failure to disclose inside information which directly
concerns the company. A successful damage claim requires, among other
things, that causation between a misstatement (or omission) and the alleged
harm is established. Causation is a complicated subject, especially when ap-
plied to misrepresentation claims.2
This article addresses causation, specifically the causal connection between the
misstatement (or omission) and the investment decision. Proving this causal
connection is often problematic, which raises the question how investors can
be effectively protected without inviting vexatious litigation and an undesir-
able expansion of liability for listed companies. The Dutch Supreme Court
recently handed down an important decision on causation in theWorldOnline
case3, dealing with prospectus liability. As will become clear later in this ar-
ticle, an indirect causal connection was considered sufficient and – more im-
portantly – a presumption of a causal connection was adopted on behalf of
investors on favorable terms. A showing of a material misstatement is suffi-
cient to activate the presumption. It is very interesting that the Dutch Supreme
Court justifies this by reference to the Prospectus Directive4 of the European
Union. According to the court, this directive requires an effective protection of
investors under the rules of national law. I believe the influence of the Pros-
pectus Directive on substantive law of causation can be relevant for other
member states of the European Union as well. Even if legislation or case
law may formally require investors to prove causation, presumptions may
assist them considerably. Moreover, the approach could extend beyond pros-
2 See e.g. the American case Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250
F.3d 87, at 95–97 (2dCir. 2001) (“It is settled that causation under federal securities laws is
two-pronged: a plaintiff must allege both transaction causation . . . and loss causation . . .
Because these concepts are somewhat elusive, they are the subject of extensive scholarly
and judicial comment.”).
3 Hoge Raad 27 november 2009, JOR 2010/43 (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.).
4 Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 [2003] OJ L345/64.
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pectus liability cases to all lawsuits alleging misstatements on the secondary
market, because disclosure requirements on the secondary market are also
based on European directives aiming at investor protection.
I first discuss causation in misrepresentation cases in general (§ 2). As we will
see, case law usually requires a causal connection between a misstatement and
the investment decision. I address two more specific questions with respect to
this causal connection: how indirect may it be (§ 3)?; and how should the
burden of proof be divided between investors and the issuer (§ 4)? The answer
to these related questions is very important for the effectiveness of the pro-
tection of (potential) investors. A comparison will be made between the law of
the Netherlands, the United States and Germany.
2 Causation in misrepresentation cases
2.1 The general framework: cause in fact and legal cause
Under the law of most jurisdictions, establishing causation is a two-step pro-
cedure. In the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) the first step is in-
dicated as the sine qua non rule (art. 3:101) and the second step as the scope of
liability (art. 3:201).5 A different terminologymay also be used in jurisdictions,
such as cause in fact or “but for” causation for the first step, and legal or
proximate cause for the second step.6
The first step consists of the inquiry whether the tort was a necessary con-
dition (condition sine qua non) for the harm of the injured party: would the
harm also have resulted in the hypothetical case that the tort would not have
occurred? Often this inquiry involves uncertainty about the hypothetical state
of the world that would have occurred absent the tort. If the injured party has
the burden of proof with respect to cause in fact, then he may face a difficult
hurdle. Courts may accept a reasonable degree of certainty as sufficient, or use
techniques such as presumptions to relieve the investor’s burden of proof.
The second step deals with the question whether and to what extent the harm
may be attributed to the tortfeasor. The answer to this questionmay depend on
factors such as: (i) the foreseeability of the damage to a reasonable person at the
time of the activity, (ii) the nature and the value of the protected interest, (iii)
the basis of liability, (iii) the extent of the ordinary risks of life, and (iv) the
protective purpose of the rule that has been violated (see art. 3:201 PETL).
5 See European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law (Springer 2005).
6 Thomas Lee Hazen, Hazen’s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulations (6th edn
Thomson West) § 12.11[1].
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2.2 The causal connection between the misstatement and the
investment decision
How is the general framework of causation applied to misrepresentation
cases? In answering this question, I will first focus on the law of the Nether-
lands, in particular the recent World Online decision7 on prospectus liability.
Comparative analysis with the law of the United States and Germany is con-
ducted in the following paragraphs.
In the Netherlands, there are no specific statutory provisions on causation in
misrepresentation cases. Recently, the Dutch Supreme Court provided some
guidance in theWorldOnline decision.WorldOnline was an internet provider
which obtained a listing in 2000. It was accused of issuing a misleading pros-
pectus for its initial public offering and publishing misleading ad hoc state-
ments.
In his concluding argument to the Supreme Court, the Advocate General
Levinus Timmerman stated that in prospectus liability cases, cause in fact
requires a causal connection between the misstatement and the investment
decision. He compared this to the Anglo-American concept of reliance8 and
the German concept of haftungsbegründende Kausalität9.10 The Dutch Su-
preme Court agrees with the Advocate General that a causal connection be-
tween the misstatement and the investment decision is required. It does not
offer any guidance on other aspects of causality, such as the question whether
it needs to be shown that the share price was distorted by the misstatement,
and whether and to what extent the harm may be attributed to the party
responsible for the misrepresentation (legal cause).
In the remainder of this paper, I would like to address two related issues with
respect to the requirement of a causal connection between the misstatement
and the investment decision. The first is how the causal connection can be
shown (see infra § 3). Is it necessary that the investor has read the information
document himself (which will often not be the case), or is a more indirect
causal connection sufficient? This is also a normative question, to be analyzed
under the heading of legal cause or the scope of liability. A second issue is how
7 Hoge Raad 27 november 2009, JOR 2010/43 (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.).
8 See Thomas Lee Hazen,Hazen’s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulations (6th edn
Thomson West), § 7.3, § 12.10.
9 See HD Assmann and R Schütze, Handbuch des Kapitalanlagerechts (CH Beck 2007)
§ 6 Rn. 175 ff.
10 He also identified a second link of cause in fact, namely the causal connection between
the drop in the stock price after disclosure of the truth. He compared this to the
American concept of loss causation and the German concept of haftungsausfüllende
Kausalität.
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the burden of proof with respect to the causal connection should be divided
(see infra § 4). The discussion of these two issues will cover both prospectus
liability cases and other secondary market liability claims.
An important theme in the next two paragraphs will be effective investor
protection. Requiring each investor to show a direct causal connection is in
practice very likely to shut the door to a successful damage claim. It would also
hinder procedures aiming at collective redress by investors or their represen-
tative organizations. As we will see, the European disclosure directives (the
Prospectus Directive11, the Transparency Directive12 and the Market Abuse
Directive13) can be interpreted as requiring effective investor protection under
the rules of national law (see infra § 4.1).
3 Effective protection (I): how indirect may the causal connection be?
3.1 Dutch law
As I have observed, the Dutch Supreme Court requires a causal connection
between the misleading prospectus and the investment decision in the World
Online decision14. However, the SupremeCourt acknowledges that the invest-
or may not actually have read the prospectus. The influence of the misstate-
ment on the investor can also have been indirect, through advices or prevailing
opinions in the market, which in turn were brought into existence by the
misleading statement. It seems that the Supreme Court accepts this indirect
influence as a sufficient causal connection. Finally, it is relevant to note that the
Supreme Court adopted a presumption of the causal connection between the
misstatement and the investment decision, based in part on the Prospectus
Directive (see infra § 4.1). This means that the issuer will have to show that the
investor did not rely directly or indirectly (through an advisor or prevailing
opinions in the market) on the misleading prospectus at the time of purchase.
With respect to lawsuits alleging misleading statements or omissions on the
secondary market, it is likely that the Supreme Court will also in principle
require a causal connection between the misstatement/omission and the in-
vestment decision. Equally, such a causal connection can probably be adopted
if the investor only relied on the misstatement through advices or prevailing
opinions in the market. It is uncertain whether a presumption of causation will
be adopted in these cases, but this is certainly possible (see infra § 4.1).
11 Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 [2003] OJ L345/64.
12 Council Directive (EC) 2004/109 [2004] OJ L390/38.
13 Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 [2003] OJ L96/16.
14 Hoge Raad 27 november 2009, JOR 2010/43 (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.).
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3.2 US securities law
In the United States, claims with respect to a misleading registration state-
ment15 can be based on s. 11 Securities Act 1933. In the United States an
investor does not need to show reliance in case of a damage claim based on
s. 11 Securities Act 1933. However, an investor who knew of the untruth or
omission has no claim. Looking beyond how the burden of proof is allocated,
it therefore seems that any form of indirect reliance is enough for a damage
claim.16 If the investor acquires the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration state-
ment, the right of recovery shall be conditioned on proof of reliance.However,
reliance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration
statement.17 If investors sue the issuer on the basis of s. 12(a) Securities Act
1933 for publishing a misleading prospectus, reliance is also not an element of
the claim.
Claims may also be based on § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Usually, this is the basis for claims
with respect to securities trading on the secondary market, but the claim may
also deal with a misleading prospectus. Reliance is an element of the claim,18
although commentators have argued that this is not obvious.19 The test is
whether the investor has relied on the misleading information at the moment
he acquired the shares, in the sense that he would not have acted (i.e. pur-
chased) had he known the truth.20 In the seminal case Basic v. Levinson21, the
15 It is defined in s.2 Securities Act 1933, by reference to s.6 Securities Act 1933, where it
says: “Any security may be registered with the Commission under the terms and con-
ditions hereinafter provided, by filing a registration statement in triplate . . .”.
16 Thomas Lee Hazen, Hazen’s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulations (6th edn
Thomson West), § 7.3[4].
17 Case law seems to indicate that investor can profit from the fraud on the market theory
(which I will discuss in a moment).
18 See Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) and Thomas Lee Hazen,
Hazen’s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulations (6th edn Thomson West) § 12.10.
19 E.g. Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009]
Wis. L. Rev. 151, 157–58.
20 The first important case that introduced the reliance requirement was List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) (“The proper test is whether the plaintiff would
have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to
him the undisclosed fact.”). See also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534
(5th Cir. 1981) (“Reliance is a causa sine qua non, a type of “but for” requirement: had
the investor known the truth he would not have acted.”). Very critical on this “tradi-
tional” reliance: Merritt Fox, ‘Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Ac-
tions’ (2005) 60 Bus. Law. 507.
21 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). For a good (and critical) discussion of many
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Supreme Court allowed investors to show reliance indirectly with respect to
securities traded on public and efficient markets. It suffices that an investor
relied on the integrity of the market price. The idea behind this approach is
that on a sufficiently efficient market, publicly available information – includ-
ing misleading information – will be reflected in the market price. Therefore,
an investor who purchases or sells shares relying on the integrity of the market
price, indirectly relies on the material misrepresentation. Under certain con-
ditions, investors can profit from a (rebuttable) presumption of reliance (see
infra § 4.2). Briefly stated, the investor needs to show a material misstatement
on an efficient market.
It is conceivable that an investor did not rely on the integrity of the market
price. If this is the case, the investor has no claim under SECRule 10b-5. From
the Basic decision, it is not completely clear what is meant by the integrity of
the market price. It may refer to (i) a market price that corresponds to the
underlying fundamental value of the security, or (ii) a market price that is the
result of the publication of timely, non-misleading information. In the Basic
case, the Supreme Court gives an example of nonreliance by referring to an
investor who believed that a target company (Basic) that denied merger ne-
gotiations was in fact involved in such negotiations. If such an investor hence
believed that the Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares
nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust
problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of certain businesses,
he could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been
manipulated. This example seems to illustrate that the Supreme Court has the
second meaning of integrity in mind.22 However, justice White appears to
favor the first meaning of integrity in his dissenting opinion. He mentions
several examples of investors not relying on the integrity of the market price: a
plaintiff who decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, to
purchase a stock; one who buys or sells a stock for reasons unrelated to its
price; onewho actually sells a stock “short” days before themisrepresentation.
issues in Basic, see Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-
Market’ [2009] Wis. L. Rev. 151.
22 See also 485 U.S. 224, 248 (“The court acknowledged that petitioners may (. . .) show
that (. . ..) an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowing the
statement was false” and 485U.S. 224, 246–247 (“Whowould knowingly roll the dice in
a crooked crap game?”). However, a case can also be made that the Supreme Court uses
the first meaning, looking at the references to lower court decisions and parliamentary
documents. See 485 U.S. 224, 244 (“The market is (. . .) informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price”; ”(. . .)
purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value”; 485
U.S. 224, 246 (“competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a
security brings (. . .) about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as pos-
sible a just price”).
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It is questionable whether these investors have not relied on the integrity of the
market price, if one adopts the second meaning indicated above.
3.3 German law
In Germany, liability for misstatements in a prospectus can be based on gen-
eral civil law (allgemein-zivilrechtliche Prospekthaftung) or the specific pro-
visions in the Stock Exchange Act (BörsenGesetz). In practice, claims are
usually based on the BörsenGesetz, so I will limit my discussion to these
claims. German law requires a causal connection between themisleading state-
ment and the investment decision (haftungsbegründende Kausalität). How-
ever, § 45 of the BörsenGesetz contains a presumption on behalf of investors
(see infra § 4.3). It is clear from that provision that a claim does not exist if the
securities have not been acquired on the basis of the prospectus, or if the
investor knew about the fraud when he acquired the security. According to
legal scholars, the prospectus only needs to be mitursachlich for the acquis-
ition, i.e. there must have been some causal connection.23 A causal connection
is also accepted if the investment decision was based on a so called Anlages-
timmung. This is not an exact legal term, but a psychological term.24 It refers to
the fact that the publication of a prospectus can induce a sentiment that can
persuade investors to buy the security. Finally, it seems that relying on an
advisor may also establish the requisite causal connection. In the Securenta
case25, an advisor had misinformed the investor on the basis of a false pros-
pectus. The Bundesgerichtshof accepted that there can be a causal connection
between the false prospectus and the investment decision. Although the claim
was based on general civil law (§ 826BürgerlichesGesetzbuch or BGB) in stead
of the specific provisions of the BörsenGesetz, it may be argued that a similar
argument can be made for a claim based on the latter provision.26
Secondary market liability claims may flow from a number of statutory
provisions. First, there are the claims for violation of the obligation to dis-
close current reports (Ad-hoc-Publizität). Liability of the issuer for unlawful
delay in the ad hoc disclosure of insider information which directly applies to
it, can be based on § 37b Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG). According to
that provision, a claim is not available for an investor who knew of the insider
23 See e.g., Ulrich Ehricke, ‘Deutschland’ in Klaus Hopt & Hans-Christoph Voigt (eds),
Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 237, 240.
24 Norbert Bröcker, in Bank- und Börsenrecht für Studium und Praxis (CH Beck 2008)
Rn. 94 f.
25 BGH 3. 12. 2007, II ZR 21/06.
26 As was done by the Advocate General Levinus Timmerman in his concluding argument
before the World Online case.
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information at the time of the transaction. According to some German schol-
ars, even if not knowing about the insider information was grossly negligent,
this still does not exclude a claim.27 A liability claim for publication of mis-
leading insider information which applies directly to the issuer, can be based
on § 37c WpHG. The claim is available for investors who relied on the truth
of the insider information and – as in § 37b WpHG – did not know of the
untruth. There is no statutory presumption of causation under these provi-
sions. There is discussion among German scholars about the Schutzzweck
(protective purpose) of §§ 37b and 37c WpHG: is it price integrity, or ena-
bling informed decision making? In the first case, reliance on the integrity of
the market price could justify a claim based on the out of pocket loss (Differ-
enzschaden)28, i.e. the difference between the price at which the transaction
occurred and the more favorable hypothetical price at which it would have
occurred. A causal connection would only be required between the unlawful
behavior and the investment decision at the given price.29 In the second case, a
causal connection would be required between the unlawful behavior and the
investment decision itself. In such cases, rescission or recessionary damages
could be claimed. Claims for violation of the Ad-hoc-Publizität can also be
based on general civil law (the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB). An investor in
principle needs to show a causal connection between the unlawful behavior
and the investment decision. There is no statutory presumption on behalf of
investors as in prospectus liability cases. A causal connection can only in
exceptional cases be based on an Anlagestimmung (the concept developed
for prospectus liability cases), because ad hoc statements are much more
limited in scope than a prospectus, see infra § 4.3. The Bundesgerichtshof
has explicitly rejected the idea that reliance on the integrity of the market
price would be a sufficient causal connection, in fear of boundless expansion
of liability.30
Secondary market liability claims can also flow from violations of the Regel-
publizität (periodic financial reports) or non-mandatory publication of mis-
leading statements. In such cases liability claims will have to be based on
general civil law. Again, it seems the investor will have to show an actual causal
connection between the unlawful behavior and the investment decision.
27 Hammen, in Bankrecht und Bankpraxis (Köln, Bank-Verlag) Rn. 7/788j (Oct. 2010).
28 Hammen, in Bankrecht und Bankpraxis (Köln, Bank-Verlag) Rn. 7/788m (Oct. 2010).
29 Schwark/ZimmerKapitalmarktrechts-Kommentar (CHBeck 2010) §§ 37b, 37cWpHG
Rn. 90.
30 BGH 4. 6. 2007, ZR 147/05.
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3.4 Comparative conclusions and comments
What to think of these Dutch, US and German approaches? I believe it is
common to the legal systems of the Netherlands, the US, and Germany that
a claim fails if an investor knew or believed that the company was misleading
the market. It does not matter whether the claim deals with primary or sec-
ondary market liability. This result is not unacceptable, as the investor did not
rely on the misstatement.31
The observation that a claim must fail for an investor in case of nonreliance,
does not fully answer the question how direct the causal connection should be
for a successful damage claim. To put it differently, what is “justifiable” reli-
ance? Of particular interest is the case of an investor X who only in a very
general way relied on the integrity of the market price, i.e. he did not read the
prospectus or secondary market corporate statement, did not consult an advi-
sor and had no knowledge of prevailing opinions (flowing from the misstate-
ment) in the market. He may have bought the security because he just thought
it would be a good investment, based on his own view of future developments,
technical analysis or a computer algorithm.My guess would be that – at least in
secondarymarket liability cases –many investors resemble this investor X. Let
us further assume that the fraud distorted the market price at which the invest-
or bought the security, so that such an investor can actually said to be harmed
by the fraud.32
The DutchWorldOnline case may imply that such an investor X has no claim,
because causation is considered absent (assuming that the issuer can prove this
mere general reliance when rebutting the presumption of causation between
the misstatement and the investment decision). In this sense, I feel that Dutch
law is too strict. Why would one want to deprive such an investor X of his
claim? Perhaps, one could argue that one may expect from an investor that he
reads and investigates information which is published by the issuer. But this is
out of line with reality, especially for retail investors.33 Another argument not
to award damages to such an investor may be that the protective purpose of
31 Still, onemaywonder whether this rule may not be too strict in some very specific cases.
See e.g. Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009]
Wis. L. Rev. 151, 162 nt 46 who mentions the case of an index fund that was required to
buy or sell stock in the index to stay consistent with its investment characterization. The
index fund can be harmed if it buys or sells stock at a distorted market price. Should the
law not allow it to recover damages?
32 If the law of a jurisdiction requires that the securitymust be held until after disclosure of
the truth for a successful damage claim, I further assume that this is the case for investor
X.
33 See forDutch law e.g. CMGrundmann-van deKrol, ‘Het informatieparadigma voorbij’
in Met Recht (Raaijkmakers-bundel) (Kluwer 2009) 165–179.
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disclosure rules (the Schutzzweck) is to enable investor to make an informed
decision, not to promote price integrity. However, it will be far from clear that
enabling the investor to make an informed decision is the only goal of disclo-
sure rules in all jurisdictions. For example, in the Netherlands it is not. In my
opinion, investors should be able to rely on the integrity of disclosure by
issuers. I feel that it enhances confidence in the proper functioning of securities
markets if investors are always protected, except for the case where they knew
the statement was misleading at the moment of the transaction.34 One may
argue that the rationale for such a rule is stronger for misstatements in a
prospectus than for (secondary market) ad hoc misstatements, because a pros-
pectus aims at directly selling securities35 and has a broader scope. However,
assuming that the market price was actually distorted by the misstatement as
we do here, would it not be better to allow a damage claim in secondary
market cases as well? Not only would the investor be compensated for his
actual losses, but allowing such claims may also deter issuers from publishing
misleading statements. If one fears excessive36 litigation (as the German Bun-
desgerichtshof), other options are available to address these concerns, such as
limiting or capping37 recoverable damages (see also infra § 4.4) and amending
procedures for collective redress in misrepresentation cases. At least in the
Netherlands, there are no signs or prospects of excessive litigation. Moreover,
34 In my opinion, uninformed reliance can even be justified on thin markets. In such cases,
the more important question is whether there is a material misstatement or omission.
35 Some American scholars have argued that non trading issuers should not be liable for
misstatements on the secondary market in violation of SEC Rule 10b-5. See John
Coffee, ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Im-
plementation’ (1996) 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1582-83 andMerritt Fox, ‘Civil Liability
and Mandatory Disclosure’ (2009) 109 Colum. L. Rev. 237.
36 Frank Easterbrook andDaniel Fischel, ‘Optimal Damages in Securities Cases’ (1985) 52
U. Chi. L. Rev. 611, 639–40 have argued that societal net harm as a result of securities
fraud is smaller than the aggregate loss of injured investors, because the loss of an
investor who pays an inflated price is offset by a gain of the investor who sells at the
inflated price. Diversified investors have an equal chance ofwinning or losing from an ex
ante perspective. Compensating ex post losers may over time result in systematic over-
compensation of these diversified investors. Also, it has been argued that there is a
“circularity problem”. This means that a diversified investor does not benefit if he is
compensated and continues to hold his stock in the company after the suit, because the
compensation is paid by the company and therefore ultimately by the investor himself.
The payment of the cost of counsel would result in an overall net loss. See James Cox &
Randall Thomas, ‘Mapping the American shareholder litigation experience: a survey of
empirical studies of the enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law’ (2009) 6 ECFR 164, 175
ff for some counterarguments. Finally, because the company usually pays and corporate
officials are often insured, securities fraud claims would not (sufficiently) succeed in
deterring fraudulent behavior. See 121Harv. L. Rev. 890, 896–897 and further references.
37 Donald Langevoort, ‘Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud’ (1996) 38
Ariz. L. Rev. 639.
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one should realize that proving a price distortion (I have simply assumed a
price distortion here) is by no means an easy task for investors, so being
investor-friendly with respect to the reliance requirement will not likely open
the floodgates.
TheUS regime of s. 11 and s. 12(a)(2) Securities Act 1933 seemsmore favorable
than Dutch law, as it (appropriately) only refuses to give a damage claim to an
investor who knew the information was false. Our investor X will be pro-
tected. The US “fraud on the market” theory for secondary market claims
based on SEC Rule 10b-5 is less clear on the position of investor X. The
concept of reliance on the integrity of the market price is somewhat unclear
in the US, as I have illustrated above. If it means that an investor has a claim if
he relied on the fact that the market price reflects timely, non-misleading
information, I believe the “fraud on the market” theory is optimal (as investor
X would be protected). However, if reliance on the integrity of the market
price means that an investor must have believed that the market price corre-
sponded to the underlying fundamental value of the security, I believe it is too
strict. I cannot think of convincing reasons why an investor should have
believed that the market price corresponds to the underlying fundamental
value. On the contrary, usually investors will buy a security because they
believe that the security is undervalued and sell because they believe it is
overvalued. This is how the securities markets work.
How does German law deal with the position of the investor X? First, let us
have a look at prospectus liability claims based on the BörsenGesetz. Looking
beyond the way the burden of proof is allocated, it seems German law will
deprive investor X of his claim. Apparently, the investor must have read the
prospectus, relied on an advisor, or relied on an Anlagestimmung. However, it
should be admitted that in practice issuers will rarely be able to rebut the
presumption of causation.38 The position of investors with respect to (secon-
dary market) liability claims may be difficult. Not only can they not profit
from a statutory presumption of causation, but an Anlagestimmung may not
easily be assumed. This would imply that the most indirect form of reliance by
investor Xwould not provide a successful damage claim.We have seen that the
Bundesgerichtshof has explicitly rejected reliance on the integrity of the mar-
ket price as a sufficient basis for causality under § 826 BGB in fear of excessive
litigation. As I have argued above, this line of reasoning is not very appealing.
Only if it is true, as German scholars have argued, that reliance on the integrity
of the market price is acceptable at least with respect to claims under §§ 37b
and 37c WpHG (allowing a damage claim based on the out of pocket loss),
investor X would be protected.
38 Baumbach/Hopt, Handelsgesetzbuch (CH Beck 2010) BörsG § 45 Rn. 2.
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4 Effective protection (II): applying a presumption of proof
4.1 Dutch law
Under Dutch law, an injured investor in principle has the burden of proving
cause in fact. This applies to both primary market and secondary market
liability claims. It is not required that there be 100% certainty that the harm
is caused by misrepresentation. Usually it is assumed that a reasonable degree
of certainty is sufficient. Moreover, the judge could use techniques such as
presumptions to relieve the investor’s burden of proof.
As we have seen, the Dutch Supreme Court requires proof of a causal con-
nection between the misstatement and the investment decision in the World
Online decision39 on prospectus liability. It acknowledges that proof of this
causal connection is problematic, because an investor will in general be guided
by a multitude of considerations. Moreover, often it will not be possible to
show that the investor actually took notice of the misleading statement, and
less so that he was actually influenced by it. The influence can also have been
indirect, because the investor relied on advices or prevailing opinions in the
market, which in turn were brought into existence by the misleading state-
ment. According to the Supreme Court, these problems of proof may have as a
result that the protection of investors which was envisioned by the Prospectus
Directive40 in practice becomes illusory. The Supreme Court notes that the
preamble of the Prospectus Directive explicitly mentions protection of (po-
tential) investors as one of the objectives. Moreover, the Prospectus Directive
requires a prospectus to contain all information necessary to enable investors
to make an informed assessment of the position of the company. Thus, the
court argues that strict compliance with this directive and the national imple-
menting rules may be required. The Supreme Court also notes that the Pros-
pectus Directive does not harmonize the civil liability of the issuer for mis-
leading statements in the prospectus, but does require member states to make
sure that national statutory provisions on civil liability apply to those who are
responsible for the information in the prospectus (art. 6(2) Prospectus Direc-
tive). Thus, an effective protection of investors according to the rules of na-
tional law is required. With a view to this effective protection and taking into
account the intended protection of (potential) investors by the Prospectus
provisions, the Supreme Court relieves the burden of proof. This is done by
accepting as a “point of departure” (which I will call a presumption for sim-
plicity) that a causal connection between the misleading prospectus and the
investment decision exists. The Supreme Court also says that this means that
39 Hoge Raad 27 november 2009, JOR 2010/43 (VEB e.a./World Online e.a.).
40 Council Directive (EC) 2003/71 [2003] OJ L345/64.
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but for the fraud the investor “would not – or in case of purchase on the
secondary market: not or not under the same conditions – have entered into
the purchase of the securities.” Apparently, the court sees a distinction be-
tween what primary and secondary market purchasers would have done, but
for the misstatement.41
According to the Supreme Court, the judge may conclude that the point of
departure does not apply. He may reach this conclusion based on the argu-
ments that have been put forward by the parties (whereby the facts underlying
these arguments should be made plausible by the most appropriate party), the
nature of the misleading statement(s) and further available information. For
example, the Supreme Court argues that the presumption does not apply if the
investment decision was taken before the misleading statement became public.
Moreover, the Supreme Court explains that nonreliance is more likely for a
professional than for a nonprofessional investor, given the professional’s
knowledge of and experience with analyzing information and the relevant
market.
Currently, it is not certain whether this approach may extend beyond pros-
pectus liability claims to other secondary market liability claims. As we have
seen, the Supreme Court justifies the presumption by referring to the Pros-
pectus Directive and the need for effective protection of investors. I would
expect the court to rule in a similar way when issuers violate periodic disclo-
sure requirements. In the preamble (nr. 1) of the Transparency Directive42 that
contains such requirements, it is noted that ”[t]he disclosure of accurate, com-
prehensive and timely information . . . builds sustained investor confidence
and allows an informed assessment . . . This enhances both investor protection
and market efficiency.”. Investor protection is thus considered important by
the European legislator not only when a prospectus is issued, but also after-
wards. The Transparency Directive moreover provides that member states
shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions on li-
ability apply to the issuers, or the persons responsible within the issuers (art.
7). Thus, one could again argue that an effective protection of investors is
required according to the rules of national law.43 Finally, the problems of proof
that the investor faces in secondary market liability cases with respect to the
causal connection between the misstatement and the investment decision, are
no different than in prospectus liability cases. These problems of proof may
have as a result that the protection which was envisioned by the Transparency
41 This may have consequences for the proper calculation of damages, but this issue is not
settled under Dutch law, so I will not discuss it further.
42 Council Directive (EC) 2004/109 [2004] OJ L390/38.
43 However, it should be admitted that article 7 of the Transparency Directive does not
refer to civil liability as the Prospectus Directive does, which weakens the argument.
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Directive in practice becomes illusory. The line of reasoning that was used by
the Supreme Court for prospectus liability cases therefore extends quite nat-
urally to claims with respect to misleading periodic reports.
Finally, one may wonder whether the line of reasoning by the Dutch Supreme
Court extends to claims for violation of the obligation of (immediate) ad hoc
disclosure of inside information which directly concerns the issuer. In the
Netherlands, civil liability is possible in such cases. This obligation is based
in part on theMarket AbuseDirective44, which aims to combat insider trading.
The Dutch legislator accepts a wider aim, namely the promotion of trans-
parency and price integrity. Again, one could argue that on these grounds
the Supreme Court may adopt a similar presumption of reliance. The Supreme
Court may also accept a presumption for a different reason. It is difficult in
omission cases – nondisclosure of a material fact – for an investor to show that
he relied on what was not said. As we will see below in US securities law, a
presumption of reliance applies in pure omission cases there. The Dutch Su-
preme Court may also be susceptible to this line of reasoning.
4.2 US securities law
As we have seen, if a damage claim is based on s.11 or 12(a)(2) Securities Act
1933, reliance is not an element of a claim. The defendant may try to show
nonreliance, though. In this respect, US securities law is very investor-friendly.
In case of misleading statements on the secondary market, investors will usu-
ally want to sue issuers on the basis of SEC Rule 10b-5. Reliance is an element
of a claim, i.e. the investor needs to show reliance. Two exceptions have been
created in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court, in the form of pre-
sumptions of proof.45
Failure to disclose
First, in cases involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reli-
ance is not a prerequisite to recovery. This was decided in Affiliated Ute v.
United States 46. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in
the making of his decision. This obligation to disclose and this withholding of
a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact. The rationale
44 Council Directive (EC) 2003/6 [2003] OJ L96/16.
45 This was affirmed in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc. et
al, 128 S.Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
46 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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for his decision is that it is difficult to prove a “speculative negative”, namely
that the investor relied on what was not said. An appellate court has later
decided that the Affiliated Ute presumption should not be applied to cases
that allege both misstatements and omissions unless the case can be charac-
terized as one that primarily alleges omissions.47
Fraud on the market presumption of reliance
As we have seen above, in Basic v. Levinson48, the Supreme Court allowed
investors to show reliance indirectly, by their reliance on the integrity of the
market price. Transactions on modern securities markets differ significantly
from face-to-face transactions. Analyzing the way active securities markets
function, the Supreme Court argues that a rebuttable presumption of reliance
can be adopted if an investor alleges and proves: (1) that the defendant made
public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepresentations were material; (3)
that the shares were traded on an efficient market; and (4) that the plaintiff
traded the shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and the
time the truth was revealed. The rebuttable presumption of reliance adopted in
Basic was essential to facilitate securities class actions in the US, because
requiring individualized proof of reliance would effectively bar class actions
from proceeding. It has allowed investors to act as a “private attorney gen-
eral”49. Soon after Basic, the number of fraud on the market suits rose dramat-
ically, which resulted in strong criticism on securities class action lawsuits. It
led US Congress to adopt the Private Securities Litigation ReformAct of 1995
(PSLRA).50 However, Basic’s presumption of reliance was left intact.
It seems that the background for the fraud on the market theory is the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH).51 Simply put, the EMH posits that an ordinary
investor cannot make trading profits on the basis of new information, because
that information is already reflected in the market price.52 In Re PolyMedica
47 Binder v. Gillespie 184 F.3d 1059, 1063–1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
48 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
49 The term was coined in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (“Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals.”); See also William Rubenstein, ‘On What a “Private Attorney General” Is –
And Why It Matters’ (2004) 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129.
50 Thomas Lee Hazen, Hazen’s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulations (6th edn
Thomson West) § 12.15.
51 This theory originates from Eugene Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Market: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383.
52 There are three major versions of the hypothesis: “weak”, “semi-strong”, and “strong”.
Weak EMH claims that prices on traded securities reflect all past publicly available
information. Semi-strong EMH claims both that prices reflect all publicly available
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Securities Litigation53 it was decided by the First Circuit, following finance
literature, that an efficient market is “one in which the market price of the
stock fully reflects all publicly available information”. With the words “fully
reflects”, the court means that the market incorporates new information in the
market price with a certain speed (“informational efficiency”), not that the
information is incorporated both quickly and correctly according to finance
theory (“fundamental efficiency”). The required speed is such that ordinary
investors cannot make trading profits on the basis of such information. The
appellate court’s definition of an efficient market and its application in the case
have been (sharply) criticized, for being too strict.54 Moreover, legal scholars
have criticized the requirement of an efficient market itself as a precondition to
the application of the fraud on the market presumption of reliance.55 I will
return to this point in the comparative conclusions below.
There has been controversy in theUS over the Fifth Circuit’s decision inOscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom56. It was argued by the Fifth
Circuit that in securities class actions, “loss causation” (i.e. a drop in the value
of the stock after disclosure of the truth57) needs to be shown at the class
certification phase by a preponderance of all admissible evidence before a
presumption of reliance can be adopted.58 Commentators and other courts
have argued that this decision is out of line with Basic v. Levinson.59 I believe
that is true.
information and that prices instantly change to reflect new public information. Strong
EMH additionally claims that prices instantly reflect even hidden or “insider” informa-
tion. There is evidence for and against the weak and semi-strong EMHs, while there is
powerful evidence against strong EMH. The EMH has come under criticism. See Lynn
Stout, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance’
(2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 639. See also FrederickDunbar andDanaHeller, ‘Fraud on the
Market Meets Behavioral Finance’ (2006) 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 455.
53 See In re PolyMedica Securities Litigation, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
54 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2284 with further references.
55 See Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009]
Wis. L. Rev. 151, 160–61.
56 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). It was followed up by Luskin v. Intervoice-Brite Inc., 261
Fed.Appx. 697 (5th Cir. 2008).
57 See e.g., Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, 464 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (“It is only after the
fraudulent conduct is disclosed to the investing public, followed by a drop in value of
the stock, that the . . . investor has suffered a “loss” that is actionable after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dura”). The court refers to Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005).
58 This is motivated by that court by pointing out that the efficient market doctrine
“facilitates an extra ordinary aggregation of claims” and the certification has “in terror-
em power”.
59 See e.g. Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009]
Wis. L. Rev. 151; In re LDK Solar Securities Litigation, 2009 WL 196396 (N.D. Cal.
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The presumption of reliance can be rebutted. According to the SupremeCourt
in Basic, “any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresen-
tation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to
trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of
reliance”. One example mentioned by the Supreme Court is that the market
price would not have been affected by the misrepresentations because market
makers were privy about the truth. Another example is that news credibly
enters the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, so that those
who trade shares after the corrective statements would have no direct or in-
direct connection with the fraud. Finally, the Supreme Court argues that
defendants could rebut the presumption of reliance as to investors who would
have divested themselves of their shares without relying on the integrity of the
market. I have already discussed this example above.
The fraud on the market theory cannot be applied on the primary market, as it
is not considered an efficient market.60 Some courts have created other con-
structions61, but these will not be discussed here. It seems logical that investor
will make a damage claim based on s. 11 or 12(a)(2) Securities Act 1933 in such
cases, so that reliance is not an element of the claim.
4.3 German law
The BörsenGesetz (§ 45) contains a presumption of a causal connection be-
tween the misleading statement and the investment decision (haftungsbegrün-
dende Kausalität) on behalf of investors. It is clear from that provision that a
claim does not exist if the securities have not been acquired on the basis of the
prospectus, or if the investor knew about the fraud when he acquired the
security. As we have seen, an indirect causal connection is accepted in German
law. Therefore, the presumption is not rebutted if the prospectus was merely
mitursachlich for the acquisition.62 If it was not mitursachlich, for example
when the investor did not know of the prospectus, then the presumption is
2009), nt 6. The Supreme Court is expected to give its opinion on the issue in the case
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.HalliburtonCo., whichwas still pending at the time this paper
was finished.
60 Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (“in an
IPO there is no well-developed market in offered securities”). In the subsequent pro-
ceedings, the district court held that an efficient market can arise shortly after the IPO.
See In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 544 F.Supp.2d 277, 295–296.
61 E.g. the fraud-created-the-market theory. See e.g. Shores v. Sklar, 844 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir.
1988); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
62 See e.g., Ulrich Ehricke, ‘Deutschland’ in Klaus Hopt & Hans-Christoph Voigt (eds),
Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 239–240.
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rebutted. Indirect reliance is also accepted on the basis of an Anlagestimmung
(investment mood), making it more difficult for the issuer to rebut the pre-
sumption. Case law has not clearly established when an Anlagestimmung can
be assumed, but it is probably limited to the six month period after admission
of the securities to the exchange.63 Finally, the defendant might not succeed in
rebutting the presumption if an investor relied on an advisor, as we have seen
above in the Securenta case64.
There are no statutory presumptions with respect to causation in secondary
market liability cases. In its ComROAD decisions65, the Bundesgerichtshof
argued that the concept of an Anlagestimmung which is used in prospectus
liability cases to relieve the burden of proof cannot be carried over to tort
liability under § 826 BGB to create a presumption. In the ComROAD case,
grossly incorrect current reports had been published. The question was
whether causality between the current reports and the investment decision of
the injured investor could be established. The court observes that the invest-
ment decision of a potential share purchaser is an individual choice whose
composition is not open to observation, but that is influenced by amultiplicity
of rational and irrational factors, in particular also by speculative elements.
According to the court, there can be no circumstantial evidence (Anscheinsbe-
weis) which creates a specific presumption that people will have a certain type
of comportment in certain situations. Current reports usually deal with new
information which can be relevant for a swift individual investment decision,
but they are as a rule not suited to create anAnlagestimmung. Nevertheless, the
court does not exclude that in a certain case the positive signals flowing from a
current report can create a real Anlagestimmung. However, even in such cases
onemaynot use amode of observation that rests on a schematic, fixed period to
form a judgment on its nature and duration. According to the Bundesgericht-
shof, the lower court had assumed anAnlagestimmung on insufficient grounds.
The assumption was not based on a concrete and thorough market analysis of
the ComROAD shares. The Bundesgerichtshof could not accept the assump-
tion by the lower court that anAnlagestimmungwas present for twoyears after
the introduction of the shares, given the high volatility of the shares. The
Bundesgerichtshof also points at themany factors that influence the share price,
by referring to its Infomatec decision66. In that decision, the court argued that
the effect of positive informationwill decrease after its publication. In any case,
anAnlagestimmungwill endwhen in the course of time other factorswhich are
relevant for the valuation of the securities become more important. The court
gives the example of a significant change in the stock market index, the state of
63 Baumbach/Hopt,Handelsgesetzbuch (CH Beck 2010) BörsG § 44 Rn. 9 and § 45 Rn. 2.
64 BGH 3. 12. 2007, II ZR 21/06.
65 BGH 4. 6. 2007, II ZR 147/05 and II ZR 173/05.
66 BGH 19. 7. 2004, II ZR 217/03, BGHZ 160, 134.
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the economy, or new company information (such as annual, half-yearly or
quarterly accounts, or a new ad hoc statement).
German scholars have argued that a particular presumption can be justified
with respect to misleading or omitted current reports under §§ 37b and 37c
WpHG, namely that investors relied on the fact that all the information that
should be disclosed is completely reflected in the market price. Such reliance
on the integrity of the market price could then justify a claim based on the out
of pocket loss (Differenzschaden).67 This line of reasoning appears to be in-
spired by the American fraud on the market theory.
4.4 Comparative conclusions and comments
Prospectus liability cases
Dutch, US and German law all relieve investors with respect to the burden of
proving a causal connection between a misleading prospectus and the invest-
ment decision. Where there are statutory presumptions of proof in the US and
Germany, there is a judicial presumption in the Netherlands.
Although all three jurisdictions use presumptions, there may be differences in
how issuers can rebut the presumption in these jurisdictions. First, we need to
remember that there could be differences in how direct reliance should be for a
successful damage claim (see supra § 3). Where in the US any form of direct or
indirect reliance is sufficient, this may not be the case in the Netherlands and
Germany, where an investor needs to have relied on opinions in the market
(Netherlands), anAnlagestimmung (Germany) or an advisor (Netherlands and
Germany). Inmyopinion, theAmericanway is to be preferred (see supra § 3.4).
A second difference is that in the Netherlands, the Supreme Court has decided
that the presumption may be rebutted for professional investors more quickly
than for retail investors. It is uncertain towhat extent such a rule also applies in
the US and Germany. Nevertheless, the intuition seems to make sense.
Secondary market cases
Differences between the three jurisdictions appear to be larger for lawsuits
alleging misleading statements or omissions on the secondary market. As we
have seen above, there are no statutory presumptions available in any of the
jurisdictions, so the courts have had to rely on their own wits.
67 Hammen, in Bankrecht und Bankpraxis (Köln, Bank-Verlag) Rn. 7/788m and 7/790a
(Oct. 2010).
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First, there is a distinction in the US between pure omission cases and other
cases. A presumption of reliance is available for investors in these omission
cases. In other cases, the US Supreme Court uses the fraud on the market
presumption of reliance. The distinction between pure omission cases and
other cases is not explicitly made in Germany and the Netherlands. However,
I feel that the intuition behind the presumption in omission cases is convinc-
ing.
One of the most remarkable conditions for the fraud on the market pre-
sumption of reliance to apply, is that investors need to show that the market
is (informationally) efficient. Such an approach is unknown in the Nether-
lands and Germany. In my opinion, this focus by (lower) US courts on
market efficiency is ungainly. Requiring proof of market efficiency severely
complicates the proceedings. It is very difficult or even impossible to test
whether the market price fully reflects all publicly available information.
Moreover, market efficiency as defined by economists is not required for
the price of a listed security to be influenced by misleading statements.68 It
that sense, following the US example does not seem attractive for European
jurisdictions; it may be at odds with the European requirement of effective
investor protection.
Onemaywonder how theGerman approach relates to the fraud on themarket
theory. In Germany, the courts have been conservative with respect to damage
claims. The Bundesgerichtshof has explicitly rejected the fraud on the market
theory for claims under § 826 BGB. We have seen that reliance on an Anla-
gestimmung (investment mood) cannot easily be accepted. Only for purchases
and sales following shortly after a misleading current report, there appears to
be some likelihood that investors can show reliance on an Anlagestimmung. It
has been questioned whether the theory of the Anlagestimmung is really
suited for relieving the burden of proof in case of misleading ad hoc state-
ments.69 According to some scholars, a presumption should be available that
investors relied on the integrity of the market price under §§ 37b and 37c
WpHG. In such cases, investors could then probably recover out of pocket
68 Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Prices of even poorly
followed stocks change in response to news . . .”). See also Brad Barber, Paul Griffin &
Baruch Lev, ‘The fraud-on-the-market theory and the indicators of common stocks’
efficiency’ (1994) 19 J. Corp. L. 285, 290–91; RJ Gilson and RH Kraakman, ‘The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 558–59; Donald Lange-
voort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009] Wis. L. Rev. 151, 161
and 186 (“It is distortion– not metrics of efficiency–that is ultimately important”).
69 Klaus Hopt and Hans-Christoph Voigt, ‘Grundsatz- und Reformprobleme der Pro-
spekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung’ in Klaus Hopt and Hans-Christoph
Voigt (eds), Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 138.
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losses.70 If a strict form of market efficiency as in the US is not required, I
believe such an approach could be acceptable.
The line of reasoning by theDutch SupremeCourt in prospectus liability cases
may provide a third way to deal with causation in lawsuits involving a mis-
statement or omission on the secondary market. It may be argued that the
problems of proof and the requirement of effective protection of investors in
the Transparency Directive and the Market Abuse Directive merit the adop-
tion of a presumption of causation between the fraud and the investment
decision.71 One could imagine that – just as in prospectus liability cases – a
presumption would be adopted if a material misstatement or omission is
shown by investors. It is not necessary that the presumption is a good reflec-
tion of how investment decisions are actually taken, as the German Bundes-
gerichtshof seems to require in the ComROAD decision (see supra § 4.3). It
could just be an act of juristic grace.72
Perhaps one may fear that such an approach would be too liberal and open the
door to an undesirable amount of securities litigation, especially when there
are procedures for the collective redress of investment losses. I think this fear is
legitimate. Securities litigation should not work as an insurance policy for
investors. However, the extent to which this fear is justified may also depend
on the proper measure of legally recoverable damages (and the way to prove
damages). For example, if legally recoverable damages are curbed as in the
United States (Rule 10b-5 cases) to the residual drop in value of the stock after
disclosure of the truth73, this would limit the amount of the damage claim.
I would favor an approach that is a little stricter for investors. In my opinion, a
presumption of causation between the unlawful behaviour and the investment
decision could be adopted if investors show with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty that the market price was distorted by the misstatement or omission. In
such cases it is likely that sophisticated investors have actually been misled, so
it seems (factually or at least normatively) acceptable to apply the presumption
that there is a causal connection between the unlawful behavior and the invest-
70 However, it not completely clear to what extent the Schutzzweck of ad hoc disclosure
rules is indeed price integrity, instead of enabling informed decision making.
71 Assuming that the national courts continue to demand such a causal connection. As I
have argued above, this is not necessary if the investor claims out of pocket losses and
the law would allow recovery of such losses.
72 Donald Langevoort, ‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009]Wis. L.
Rev. 151, 161.
73 Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, 464 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (“It is only after the fraudulent
conduct is disclosed to the investing public, followed by a drop in value of the stock, that
the . . . investor has suffered a “loss” that is actionable after the SupremeCourt’s decision
in Dura”).
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ment decision of the individual investor.74 This approach is probably more
liberal than the approach of theGerman courts from the investor’s perspective,
for theremay be cases where a presumption can be used even if there is no clear
Anlagestimmung (e.g. omission cases). It is not necessarily stricter than the US
approach in Basic v. Levinson. Investors need not show that the market was
efficient, because the price can also be influenced on an inefficient market. My
approach differs somewhat from the rule in Oscar75. In that case, it was re-
quired of investors to show a drop in the value of the stock after disclosure of
the truth (“loss causation”) before a presumption of reliance can be adopted.
As legal scholars in the US have observed, there may be clear indications that
the market price was influenced by the fraud, but it may be hard to show
exactly when the fraud dissipated the price.76 Therefore, requiring evidence of
loss causation before a presumption of reliance/causation is adopted, may be
too strict.
5 Conclusion
I have addressed the requirement of causation in misrepresentation cases,
specifically the causal connection between the misstatement and the invest-
ment decision. Proving this causal connection is often problematic, which
raises the question how investors can be effectively protected without inviting
excessive litigation. The analysis was conducted from the perspective of
Dutch, US and German law, for both primary and secondary market liability
claims.
A first question that has been analyzed is how direct the causal connection
should be for a successful damage claim. In other words, what is “justifiable”
reliance? Is it required that an investor has read and relied on the misleading
statement, or is it sufficient that he relied on advices, opinions in the market or
even the integrity of the market price? We have seen that indirect forms of
reliance are accepted in all three jurisdictions, but the Netherlands and Ger-
many do not seem to allow reliance on the integrity of the price as the US
does.77 I have argued that investors should be able to rely on the integrity of
disclosure by issuers (on both the primary and secondary market), and hence
74 I do not argue here that applying such a presumption necessarily implies the availability
of a rescissionary remedy for the investor. The scope of liability may be more limited,
taking into account the protective purpose of disclosure rules and the nature and re-
moteness of the damage.
75 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
76 See the dissenting opinion by Judge Dennis in theOscar case, and Donald Langevoort,
‘Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market’ [2009] Wis. L. Rev. 151, 186.
77 There may be an exception in Germany for claims under §§ 37b and 37c WpHG.
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also on the integrity of the market price (see supra § 3.4). Such reliance could
justify a damage claim based on the out of pocket loss.78
Another question that has been analyzed is whether and under what condi-
tions a presumption of proof should be used on behalf of investors. We have
seen that the Dutch Supreme Court, recognizing problems of proof, has ac-
cepted a presumption on favorable terms for prospectus liability cases. A
material misstatement or omission is sufficient to activate the presumption.
The adoption of the presumption was in part motivated by referring to the
Prospectus Directive which requires an effective protection of investors. We
have seen that the line of reasoning of the court extends quite naturally to
claims dealing with the violation of ad hoc disclosure obligations and mislead-
ing periodic reports on the secondary market. These disclosure obligations are
based on European directives requiring effective investor protection as well.
One may wonder whether it is too investor-friendly if this approach is ex-
trapolated to lawsuits alleging a misstatement or omission on the secondary
market, inviting excessive litigation. No efficient market would be required as
under the US fraud on the market theory. Nor would there have to be an
Anlagestimmung (the German concept of an investment mood). I have argued
for a stricter approach (see supra § 4.4), implying that a presumption may be
adopted if investors showwith a reasonable degree of certainty that themarket
price was distorted by the misstatement or omission. Under such a condition,
the difficulties with the concept of an efficient market as in US case law are
avoided. The concept of an Anlagestimmung, which according to some Ger-
man scholars is not very suitable for relieving the burden of proof in lawsuits
alleging misleading ad hoc statements, need not be used. But as a showing of
price distortion is not always easy, excessive litigation can be avoided.
78 I do not argue here that the out of pocket loss is the proper scope of liability, which
could be curbed further.
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